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3 EU POLICY POSITIONS 
These are challenging times for the 
European Union with its development of 
a common foreign and security policy 
This article explores the reasons behind 
the EU's quest for a common policy and 
why many in the Union see it as a 
necessary part of the EU 's functions. 
7 NATO AND EU OPTIONS 
For the organisations most closely 
involved with the structure of European 
security, 1996 proved to be a busy year. 
This article looks at the options facing 
the main players in the European 
security and defence arena. 
1 2 SECURITY ORGANISATIONS 
An overview of the various security 
organisations and who belongs to what. 
14 MAASTRICHT TREATY 
A look at the provisions in the 
Maastricht Treaty (Title V) dealing with 
the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy. 
IGC POSITION 16 
An extract from the European 
Commission's submission to the Inter-
Governmental Conference (IGC) giving 
the Commission's view on how common 
foreign and security policy should 
change. 
JOINT ACTIONS 18 
A list of joint actions adopted by the 
Council since the entry into force of the 
Treaty on European Union (November 
1993-September 1996) 
COMMON POSITIONS 19 
A list of common positions adopted by 
the Council since the entry into force of 
the treaty on European Union (November 
1993-September 1996) 
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EU tries to build an effective CFSP 
These are confusing times for 
anyone trying to work out whether 
the European Union (EU) has any prospect of 
developing a common foreign and security 
policy (CFSP) worth the name. When the CFSP 
was established, it was in answer to a range of 
internal and external challenges. Internally, the 
completion of the Single Market and the drive 
towards economic and monetary union (EMU) 
necessitated corresponding moves towards 
political union, of which CFSP was a central 
element. Externally Europe was expected to use 
its economic weight to achieve more political 
influence and ensure stability around its 
borders. 
The 1991 Maastricht negotiations to 
establish the treaty on European Union 
took place in the midst of a geopolitical 
earthquake which hit Europe following the 
collapse of communism and failed to take 
into account, let alone attempt to meet, the 
enormous challenges posed by the 
unification of Germany, the sweeping 
changes in central Europe and the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union. 
There were high expectations for the CFSP 
which superseded the previous light 
framework of European Political Co-
operation (EPC). The European Council 
became directly involved, not only through 
the single institutional structure, but also as 
the body to issue mandates for joint actions. 
Title V included a number of improvements, 
such as the ending of taboo areas (one could 
now discuss issues having military implications), 
the provision for joint actions (Article J.3), and 
even for majority voting, albeit only on the 
implementation of joint actions, common 
positions (Article J.2) and the inclusion of 
security and defence (Article J.4) with the WEU 
designated "an integral part of the development 
of the European Union". 
The final text of the treaty represented a 
compromise between the advocates of a 
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community approach (eight member states led 
by Germany) and those in favour of an inter-
governmental approach (four member states led 
by Britain and France). Given the need for 
unanimity at the IGC, the minority in favour of an 
intergovernmental approach were able to carry 
the day. 
A pillar structure was thus established which 
involved different arrangements for CFSP (inter-
governmental. also for the third pillar covering 
Justice/Internal Affairs) than used for the first, or 
community pillar. Jacques Delors considered 
the changes a recipe for confusion. Regrettably, 
his forecast has been proved all too accurate 
with numerous EU disputes over competencies 
between the different pillars. 
The treaty text also papered over a dispute 
between the so-called Atlanticists and 
Europeans as regards the question of common 
defence. It was agreed to review the defence 
aspect and the institutional working of CFSP at 
the IGC in 1996. Since Maastricht, three 
countries (Austria, Sweden and Finland) have 
joined the EU, one of which has a 1200 km 
border with Russia. 
There are now 10 central European and Baltic 
states who have made it crystal clear that 
EU membership is a top priority. Cyprus is 
also waiting to start accession negotiations 
after the Inter-Government Conference 
(IGC), while it should not be forgotten that 
Turkey and Switzerland still have 
applications on the table. Malta froze its 
application in November 1996 after its 
recent change of government. 
In short, it is not difficult to imagine a much 
larger EU within the next decade. One of the 
issues which should have been centre stage at 
the IGC is -what are the implications of such 
an enlargement for CFSP? 
I NEED FOR AN EFFECTIVE CFSP 
To begin, it is important to answer the question 
why we need a CFSP The answer is fourfold. 
First, the voice of Europe will only be heard in 
world affairs if there is a single voice. 
Otherwise, it will not be heard at all, and 
that is against our common interest. 
Second, the end of the Cold War has 
dramatically changed the European 
Union's strategic situation. The Soviet 
threat has disappeared, but many different 
new risks have appeared. These include 
local conflicts, with the potential to spill-
over to neighbouring states or to escalate, 
terrorism, extremism, fundamentalism, 
international crime and arms trafficking, 
including the illegal sale of nuclear 
materials. It is clear that member states 
acting together will have far greater 
influence than acting alone. 
Third, the US has reduced its presence in 
Europe substantially and Europe will have 
to take on more responsibility for its own 
security. 
Fourth, the treaty contains a binding 
commitment for the Union to develop a CFSP 
After all, this is a legal commitment which all 
member states have accepted and are bound to 
respect. 
For all these reasons the EU needs to develop a 
CFSP which is able to . meet the challenges of 
our times. With nearly 380m people, with a 
combined GNP ahead of the US, with the 
largest single market in the world, as the most 
important player in international trade, as the 
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main source of development 
assistance and humanitarian aid, 
the EU cannot avoid taking 
increased responsibility in world 
affairs. 
I CFSP IN OPERATION 
Although the CFSP only has been 
in operation for three years, it has 
been widely criticised for its cumbersome 
procedures and lack of effectiveness. Henry 
Kissinger's question in the early 1970s, "who do 
we call in Europe?", remains unanswered. An 
earnest debate on how to improve the CFSP is 
gathering pace at a time when the EU's three 
biggest diplomatic players - Germany, France 
and Britain - have been struggling hard to 
maintain a minimum of consensus over some of 
the biggest foreign policy challenges they face, 
such as the conflict in former Yugoslavia. 
Throughout much of the Bosnian drama, 
Germany displayed more sympathy with US 
attitudes than those of her EU partners. On 
policy towards Iraq, the alignment is different: 
Britain backs the US tough stance, while France 
and Germany take a softer line. In respect to 
Cuba and Iran, however, the Europeans are 
united in their opposition to the US big stick 
approach. 
These difficulties do not mean the quest for a 
more effective CFSP should be abandoned. The 
main argument in favour of such a policy is 
worth repeating: in most parts of the world, the 
EU will either speak with one voice, or its voice 
will not be heard at all. 
This also applies in Washington where US 
officials, unlike the situation in 1991, have made 
clear their preference for a single European 
voice in international affairs. Indeed the Clinton 
Administration is perhaps the strongest 
supporter of the need to create an European 
Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). 
At the Berlin Nato meeting in June 1996, there 
was agreement on the need to establish ESDI 
and to make operational the concept of 
Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF). 
Discussions are currently taking place between 
WEU and Nato on fulfilling this mandate but it is 
unlikely that there will be any agreement on the 
details until after the conclusion of the IGC at 
which a review of CFSP in operation and the 
defence dimension are high on the agenda. 
An initial assessment of the CFSP in operation is 
rather disappointing. Certainly there has been a 
vast increase in the number of meetings and a 
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considerable reorganisation of the various 
bureaucracies involved. The European 
Commission has established a separate 
Directorate General (DGIA) to cover CFSP, under 
the mixed authority of President Jacques Santer 
and Hans van den Broek. The Council has also 
established a new Directorate to deal with CFSP, 
headed by a British diplomat. and the WEU's 
Secretariat has moved from London to Brussels. 
Since the treaty came into operation on 
November 1 1993, the EU has agreed a number 
of joint actions including : 
- monitoring elections in Russia and in South 
Africa 
- providing humanitarian assistance in former 
Yugoslavia and establishing an administration 
for Mostar 
- supporting the Middle East Peace Process 
- lobbying for the extension of the NPT 
- agreeing export guidelines for the use of dual 
use goods 
- agreement on policy towards export and 
control of anti-personnel mines 
- promoting the Stability Pact to tackle problems 
concerned with borders/minorities in central 
Europe and the Baltic States 
In addition to these "joint actions", a number of 
"common positions" (i.e. alignment of policies 
but not necessarily taking action together or 
committing resources) have been adopted on 
Libya, Sudan, Haiti, Rwanda, Ukraine and 
Burundi. 
Joint actions have been useful (particularly the 
Stability Pact with its mixture of diplomatic 
pressure and community assistance) in concert 
with the positions of member states on some 
key issues, but they have not led to increased 
EU visibility or really decisive action. 
The scope has been modest and the added 
value of CFSP not always apparent. The most 
visible failures have been in Yugoslavia and, to a 
lesser extent, in Rwanda. 
I WEAKNESSES OF CFSP 
The first obvious weakness - and the most 
difficult to overcome - is the lack of political will 
to act decisively as a Union. This may be due 
either to divergent perceptions of national 
interests, or to unwillingness to accept the 
political, and sometimes budgetary costs, of 
firm action. 
Most member states seem to accept that they 
cannot hope to gain as much influence by acting 
alone, they still seem reluctant to move towards 
a credible and effective CFSP. This criticism is 
directed more towards the larger member states 
(French Middle East policy) but not exclusively 
(Greece's attitude towards the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia and Albania). As a result 
there is still too much reliance on declamatory 
diplomacy. 
The second weakness has been the lack of any 
definition of essential common interests of the 
Union in specific foreign policy situations. 
In addition to divergent national perceptions, 
this can be attributed to a failure to analyse the 
implications of pursuing, or not pursuing, 
different courses of action. 
A third weakness has been the decision-making 
procedure which is based on unanimity. This 
means that the Union's capacity to act may 
depend on the inclination of its most reluctant 
member state on any given issue. 
A further problem is the rather leisurely pace of 
Political Committee proceedings (usually 
monthly) compared to the continuous activity in 
the committee of permanent representatives of 
member states to the EU (known as Coreper) 
with weekly meetings. 
Fourth, present financing arrangements for joint 
actions are inadequate. There is confusion over 
the relationship between CFSP budget line as 
such, and budget lines for the Community 
activities which may support actions under the 
CFSP. 
Other weaknesses can be cited such as the lack 
of a legal personality, the lack of coherence 
between and confusion over the pillars which 
operate under different rules and procedures, 
ambiguity concerning the respective roles of the 
presidency and the Commission (disputes over 
the interpretation of "fully associated") and the 
form of the Union's external representation. 
Some foreign ministers holding the presidency 
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seem to have difficulty in making 
any distinction between 
representing a national position 
and an EU position. In many 
capitals outside Europe, the 
presence of the EU is conspicuous 
by its absence. 
I NEED FOR IMPROVEMENTS 
Given the prospect of a substantially enlarged 
Union in the not too distant future, an 
increasingly unstable international environment 
and encouragement from the US to achieve a 
credible CFSP, it is imperative that the IGC 
results in an enhanced and effective CFSP. 
Although an absence of political will cannot 
itself be tackled through procedural 
improvements, such improvements, taken 
together, may reinforce the sense of common 
objectives and common interests, leading to a 
greater propensity to act together. 
There are a number of proposals already on the 
table, some of which have been aired in Mr 
Westendorp's Reflection Group. These include : 
* Policy planning: An awareness of common 
European interests can be increased by partially 
pooling the Union's capacity for policy analysis. 
This already takes place to some extent through 
the exchange of information on the EU 
telegraphic COREU network and by joint 
meetings of policy planning staff from the 
member states and the Union's institutions. 
Such co-operation is limited, however, and 
could be enhanced by establishing a joint 
structure for the evaluation of information, policy 
analysis and preparation of policy actions. There 
is broad agreement on the need for such a body 
but little agreement on what mandate it should 
have, what size it should be and what access it 
should have to confidential information. 
* Objectives and priorities: The treaty and 
European Council conclusions provide only a 
general guide to the objectives and priorities of 
the CFSP. This hampers decisive action when 
situations arise requiring preventive diplomacy, 
crisis management or conflict resolution. 
The Union's capacity for action could be 
enhanced if it were to produce an annual report 
and guidelines for the Union's external relations. 
This could be a task for the Policy Planners 
mentioned above. 
The Council would then debate the guidelines, 
having first sought the views of the European 
Parliament. After Parliament had given its 
opinion, the guidelines could be reviewed by the 
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Council and then transmitted to the European 
Council for approval. 
These guidelines would then create the 
parameters for EU decision-making on external 
policy during the course of the year. 
An alternative approach might be to write 
priority areas, such as relations with the 
associated countries, Russia and the CIS, the 
Balkans, Mediterranean and Middle East, into 
the treaty to ensure the necessary commitment 
from all member states to common action. 
I DECISION-MAKING 
Until now unanimity has been required for joint 
action under the CFSP although, in principle, the 
treaty allows for decision by qualified majority 
on the details of implementing measures. 
This means that the Union's capacity for action 
can be limited by the reluctance of a single 
member state. Respecting national prerogatives 
on matters of vital interest in fundamental areas 
of foreign and security policy, decision-making 
rules could be changed to permit member 
states wishing to take action together, to do so 
within the framework of the treaty. 
Such actions would only be agreed if they fell 
within the broad guidelines approved by the 
European Council. 
Other member states, though not necessarily 
participating directly, would not be able to 
prevent the joint action from taking place. 
Such an approach, which will be even more 
desirable in an enlarged EU, finds its origin in the 
declaration attached to the treaty concerning 
the CFSP, which aims at preventing the 
blockage of unanimity where a qualified majority 
exists. 
Obviously there needs to be a reform of the 
voting system to allow for a greater correlation 
with population size. 
Ministers also need to discuss issues working 
from a similar information basis; and the CFSP 
infrastructure (working groups, planners, 
political committee), must prepare options for 
ministerial decision. 
There is a strong case for a permane.nt political 
meeting in Brussels, perhaps at deputy level. 
I EXTERNAL REPRESENTATION 
Under the treaty, the presidency was given an 
increased role as regards external 
representation of the Union. The Commission 
was also tasked, together with the Council, with 
ensuring coherence between the pillars. It is 
doubtful, however, whether the present six-
monthly rotation system can be maintained in an 
enlarged Union. 
It is increasingly difficult for the small states to 
run the Presidency. Even with adjustments to 
the troika rotation, one cannot escape the fact 
that future enlargements will concern mainly 
small states. 
The most appropriate solution is not a 
directorate nor a new body - a Mr/Ms CFSP -
to oversee CFSP, but rather a strengthening of 
the Community institutions. 
As far as the Commission's role is concerned, it 
is fully associated with the implementation of 
the CFSP and has the right of initiative, a right 
shared with the Presidency and other member 
states. 
The Commission is well placed to provide the 
European perspective and has demonstrated 
this in the past two years by preparing 
numerous papers covering EU policy towards 
central Europe, Russia, Ukraine, the Baltic 
states, the Mediterranean, Asia, Japan, 
Mercosur, etc. Member states inevitably 
approach problems from a national perspective 
whilst the Council has neither the experience 
nor the critical mass of officials to undertake 
new tasks in CFSP. 
The Commission is an institution which provides 
continuity through changing presidencies and 
troikas. On the whole the Presidency-
Commission form of external representation is 
more coherent than the somewhat unwieldy 
troika formula. 
In the long term, under the impact of 
enlargement, there is a strong case for the 
European Commission to act, under a Council 
mandate, in the whole range of external policies. 
One could envisage a senior Vice-President for 
foreign affairs (rather like the US trade 
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negotiator) who would speak for, 
and represent the Union in areas 
agreed upon by the Council. 
An alternative proposal which has 
been suggested would involve an 
independent CFSP secretariat, 
roughly modelled on Nato. But it is 
difficult to see how this would 
improve coherence or reduce 
confusion as to who speaks for 
Europe. One could, however, 
envisage ad hoe special representatives being 
mandated to deal with specific issues - rather 
like Carl Bildt in former Yugoslavia. 
I SECURITY AND DEFENCE 
The Maastricht Treaty provides for the possibility 
of a common defence policy, which might in 
time lead to a common defence. In the past 
three years little progress has been made 
towards achieving this goal. 
The relationship between the WEU and Nato is 
indeed more highly developed than that 
between the WEU and the EU. WEU was 
supposed to complement CFSP by providing a 
military component, but apart from its 
involvement in Mostar, there has been no 
operational tasking by the EU. 
The relationship between the WEU, which is 
according to the treaty "an integral part of the 
development of the European Union", the EU 
itself and Nato, which is today the principal 
framework for ensuring the defence of its 
members, is a sensitive area and the IGC will 
wish to consider various options: whether to 
maintain the status quo, whether to enhance the 
capability of the WEU but leaving it outside the 
EU, or whether to bring it within the single 
institutional framework of the EU, albeit perhaps 
as a separate pillar. 
At present it is difficult to envisage agreement to 
bring the WEU into the EU framework in the near 
future but it is important not to relinquish this as 
an EU goal. Obviously the extent of any changes 
will depend on outside developments, 
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particularly in Russia and the US, as well as EU 
internal dynamics. 
Meanwhile, there are moves on a more 
mundane level to harmonise presidencies and 
to improve the exchange of documents and 
cross-participation in meetings. 
Working towards a consensus on the future 
division of responsibilities between the WEU 
and Nato, the EU is gradually attempting to 
create a European intervention force, under the 
WEU umbrella, for use in the framework of joint 
actions under the CFSP 
There is increasing awareness that one of the 
most glaring lessons of the Yugoslav crisis is 
that the lack of a credible military instrument 
severely handicaps diplomatic efforts. 
One of the most significant changes since 1991 
has been the change in the US position as 
regards a European security and defence 
identity (ESDI). 
There is a strong argument that the future health 
of the transatlantic relationship depends on the 
EU developing an effective CFSP, including a 
defence dimension. Talk of a new transatlantic 
treaty is premature, however, at least until the 
Union demonstrates that it is capable of an 
effective foreign and security policy. 
I DEBATE WITHIN THE EU 
There have been a wealth of position papers 
submitted by member states, the European 
Institutions and other bodies to the Reflection 
Group and to the IGC. Most recognise the need 
to strengthen the CFSP but there is still 
remarkably little consensus on the details. 
Germany and the Benelux have consistently 
been one of the strongest supporters of a 
communautaire approach to CFSP Britain has 
rejected any moves to weaken the present inter-
governmental structures, whilst France is 
prepared to consider some modifications in an 
effort to improve efficiency. Interestingly 
Sweden and Finland, two of the new member 
states and both "neutral", have introduced 
papers allowing for the EU to take over 
responsibility for some WEU actions in the 
humanitarian and crisis management fields. 
I CONCLUSION 
Former EU President Jacques Delors used to 
pose three questions about foreign policy to 
member states of the EU, "What are our 
essential common interests ? Are we prepared 
to act together to defend these interests? If so, 
with what resources?" 
These questions remain valid today and will 
become even more valid in light of the 
subsequent enlargement of the Union. 
No one doubts that developing a credible and 
effective CFSP will take time and will require 
familiarity, practice and confidence. 
Time is not on the Union's side since the need 
for an effective CFSP, recognised by public 
opinion in the member states, is even greater 
now than it was at the time of Maastricht. The 
end of the Cold War and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union have been accompanied by the 
appearance of new risks to European security. 
There can be no effective CFSP without the 
wholehearted participation of all member states. 
The British (and to a lesser extent the French) 
seem incapable of overcoming their ideological 
hostility to the community approach in foreign 
policy. 
They certainly have an argument concerning the 
sensitive issue of distribution of votes in the 
Council. But even if they were to receive a larger 
number of votes, it seems unlikely that they 
would agree to drop their veto in CFSP. Nor do 
they seem willing to accord the Commission a 
greater role in representing the EU to the outside 
world. 
At present, the British and French governments 
take the view that only minor adjustments are 
required and that the CFSP must remain firmly 
on an inter-governmental basis. It must be 
doubtful, however, whether an enlarged EU with 
many more member states can operate an 
effective CFSP purely on an inter-governmental 
basis. * 
Fraser Cameron, Foreign Policy Adviser, DGIA, 
European Commission, is writing in a personal 
capacity 
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Security concerns remain a priority in 
a changing Europe 
was finally accepted of establishing ESDI 
within Nato and where further development 
of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 
mechanism was authorised. 
Why this sudden bewilderment? This confusion? Why are the streets and squares 
The Berlin meeting was the latest, but not 
the last, stage in a long process of often 
emptying so rapidly, everyone going home, lost in thought? Because night has fallen, bitter bargaining across the Atlantic, both 
as far as fundamental political questions 
were concerned, and on the finer details of 
military co-operation. Even during the cold 
and the Barbarians have not come! 
And some of our men, just in from the border, Say there are no Barbarians any longer. 
Now what's going to happen to us without the Barbarians? They were, those people, after all, A war, when perceptions of a common 
military threat helped to cement US-
European relations, the trans-Atlantic kind of solution. 
For the organisations most closely involved 
with the structure of European security, 1996 
proved to be a busy year. 
Not only are these bodies adapting internally, 
they are also fast approaching the point 
where they take on new members. 
For the European Union (EU) the big event for 
1996 (and much of 1997) continues to be the 
Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) 
launched in Turin in March 1996. 
One part of the review will try to improve the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). 
CFSP grew out of the wish to give some 
substance to a post-cold war European 
Security and Defence Identity (ESDI). 
In a form of words which some took to be a 
challenge to Nato, the Maastricht Treaty 
included in its mandate for CFSP "all 
questions related to the security of the Union, 
including the eventual framing of a common 
defence policy which might in time lead to a 
common defence". 
It remains to be seen how much, if any, 
progress can be made by the IGC towards 
such a policy and a common defence. 
Nato is also on the verge of deciding which 
countries to admit as new members and 
when following publication of its enlargement 
study in December 1995. 
The December 1996 session of the North 
Atlantic Council had been expected to be the 
point at which invitations would be sent out 
(most likely to Poland, Hungary and the 
Czech Republic), but the long-awaited 
decision has been postponed to summer 
1997. 
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Thucydides's account of the Peloponesian war 
I ASSESSMENT 
The alliance has also been reassessing its likely 
missions and reorganising its military structure. 
Nato is anxious as well to have any reforms 
more or less complete with the 16 current 
members before enlargement takes place. 
Another player on the European security scene · 
is the Western European Union (WEU). The WEU 
has drawn up contingency plans and lists of 
Forces Answerable to WEU (FAWEU) which 
could be deployed on the humanitarian, peace-
keeping and crisis management tasks 
described in the WEU Council's Petersberg 
Declaration of June 19 1992. 
So far the WEU's main role has been to act as a 
bridge between Nato and the EU. In the 
declaration attached to the Maastricht Treaty, 
WEU member states described the organisation 
"as the defence component of the European 
Union and as the means to strengthen the 
European pillar of the Atlantic alliance". 
I TOO MANY QUESTIONS 
How and why did the European security debate 
develop as it did in 1996? As the key institutions 
move closer to admitting new members, what 
precisely is the European Security and Defence 
Identity (ESDI) which will be on offer to both old 
and new members? 
The defining moment in the development of a 
post-cold war European security order may 
prove to be Nato's North Atlantic Council 
meeting in June 1996 in Berlin, where the idea 
partnership had some uneven moments. 
The burden-sharing debate, and the 
constant search for a more equitable and 
efficient way to distribute the risks and 
responsibilities of western security, was a 
perennial feature of Nato politics. 
After 1989, with mounting pressure for a 
Continentalist (rather than Atlanticist) approach 
to European security, and with deep 
disagreements over the Yugoslav crisis, the 
partnership looked for a while to be on its last 
legs. In March 1991 US Under-Secretary of 
State Reginald Bartholomew sent a note to 
European capitals in which he made it plain that 
while the US would welcome a European voice 
in Nato, it was uneasy about the prospect of a 
European security caucus within the alliance, 
possibly based on the WEU, which could 
browbeat the US. The Americans would prefer 
their European allies to come to North Atlantic 
Council meetings negotiating as individuals 
rather than as a collective body. 
The trans-Atlantic partnership took its biggest 
nose-dive in November 1994, when the Clinton 
administration announced it would no longer 
help to enforce the UN arms embargo on the 
Bosnian government. But by mid-1996 the 
debate seemed to be reaching a conclusion. 
I FRANCE'S RAPPROCHEMENT 
France's partial rapprochement with Nato is one 
explanation for the new mood. In December 
1995, following Nato's decision to send a 
60,000-strong force to Bosnia-Herzegovina, the 
French defence minister announced his 
country's intention to improve relations with 
Nato. France would take part in Nato's Military 
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Committee, improve its relations 
with the alliance's military staff and 
work more closely with Nato's 
military command. Full re-
admission to the alliance, which 
would include renewed member-
ship of the integrated military 
structure and co-operation in 
nuclear planning, remains off the 
agenda - at least for the present. 
The steps taken by France have 
certainly electrified the alliance. By endorsing 
the new dynamism of Nato's involvement in 
Bosnia, and keen for domestic reasons to 
restructure its armed forces and reduce defence 
spending, France has acknowledged that the 
best hope for a well-organised, meaningful and 
cost-effective European security structure lies in 
Nato, rather than in some exclusively European 
institution or formation such as Eurocorps. 
Nevertheless, the French government still 
hankers for a more Continentalist solution, even 
if only as a long-term objective. At a WEU 
parliamentary assembly session in February 
1996, for example, France joined Germany in 
reiterating the call for an eventual merger of the 
WEU with the European Union (EU) -
anathema to Britain and, less directly, to the US. 
What sets recent events apart is that Nato has 
also been taking a few steps of its own. France 
was not merely moving closer to Nato, it was 
meeting a reforming Nato half-way. 
Some might say France moved with such 
alacrity simply to be in a position to influence 
Nato's dramatic reform process more 
favourably from within. For this meeting of 
minds to be harmonious and constructive, an 
elaborate diplomatic formula would be 
necessary. This was precisely the outcome of 
the meeting of Nato's foreign ministers in Berlin 
in early June 1996. 
I NAT01S IDEAS 
The final communique of the Berlin meeting sets 
out Nato's contribution to the new European 
security framework. According to the 
communique the alliance will continue to be a 
trans-Atlantic partnership, but will incorporate a 
functioning European Security and Defence 
Identity. This formula will enable "all European 
allies to make a more coherent and effective 
contribution to the missions and activities of the 
alliance as an expression of our shared 
responsibilities; to act themselves as required; 
and to reinforce the trans-Atlantic partnership". 
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The alliance will also continue to adapt itself to 
be able to carry out the full range of missions 
from humanitarian aid to collective self-defence. 
To carry out crisis management and peace-
keeping operations better, and to give strength 
and meaning to European Security and Defence 
Identity, the communique endorses the steady 
development of the Combined Joint Task Force 
idea. 
The document also addresses other important 
issues confronting the alliance - in particular 
outreach to former adversaries and, ultimately, 
enlargement. The Combined Joint Task Force 
scheme is still several months from completion, 
but the Berlin communique does indicate what 
might be involved. 
The first point to note is that, as a style of 
military co-operation, Combined Joint Task 
Force is by no means a new idea. 
Nato's defence ministers met in Brussels on 
June 13 1996 (with France's defence minister 
taking part for the first time since the late 1960s) 
and defined CJTF a "multinational and multi-
service formation established for specific 
contingency operations". Using Nato's 
definition and a little imagination, Thucydides's 
account of the Peloponesian war in the fifth 
century BC could be said to contain plenty of 
evidence on the use of CJTF. 
It is clear from the Berlin communique that Nato 
has ambitions to be a crisis manager and 
peace-keeper in its own right, with the 
appropriate mandate from the United Nations 
(UN) or the Organisation for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE). 
The original, autumn 1993 version of the CJTF 
concept envisaged something rather different. 
Nato forces and command structures would be 
earmarked for use by European members of the 
alliance in crises and operations below the level 
of collective self-defence, which would remain 
Nato's core task and rationale. 
Certain Nato assets - described as "separable 
but not separate" - would by some means be 
lent to the European allies (and possibly others) 
via the WEU. 
The foundations for this arrangement had 
already been laid in the Oslo commu_nique of 
June 4 1992, which was broadly supportive of 
an enhanced operational capacity for the WEU. 
Nato soon became aware it might be creating a 
monster. The alliance also realised it should 
have some means to carry out these 
supplementary, "non-Article 5" or "out of area" 
missions (those actions taken outside the 
geographical area of Europe in which Nato 
operates). 
International legitimacy and public approval of 
military activities are more readily available for 
peace-keeping and crisis management tasks 
than for defence against some notional threat. 
The North Atlantic Council tried repeatedly to 
position Nato as an organisation for crisis 
management and in doing so rejected any neat 
division of labour between Nato and the WEU, 
with the former responsible for collective 
defence and the latter for non-Article 5 
operations. In September 1993 Nato Secretary 
General Manfred Worner destroyed any 
remaining illusions by declaring that non-Article 
5 missions were no longer to be considered the 
exclusive preserve of the WEU. 
So CJTF has become a mechanism for Nato 
crisis management as well as a means to satisfy 
demands for a European identity. The June 13 
Nato defence ministers communique shows 
exactly where the alliance's priorities lie in 
setting up the CJTF scheme: "an exercise 
should be conducted as soon as practicable, 
based on the deployment of a CJTF for a Nato-
led contingency operation. We also invite the 
WEU to work with Nato on the preparation for a 
subsequent CJTF exercise based on a WEU-led 
operation." 
I NATO RESTRUCTURING 
CJTF must also be placed in the context of the 
progressive restructuring of Nato. Shortly after 
the January 1994 Brussels summit at which the 
CJTF idea was formally endorsed, Nato's 
Secretary-General Worner described the 
scheme as "the next logical step" in adapting 
Nato's force structures, a process which had 
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been underway since the London 
Declaration of July 1990 and the 
launch of the alliance's new 
strategic concept in November 
1991. 
Adaptation of the alliance's 
command and force structure 
continued after the 1994 summit. 
The military implications of the 
Partnership for Peace (PFP) 
scheme, the CJTF idea and the 
plan to improve Nato's relations with WEU 
would all require a great deal of complex staff 
work. 
A new set of Nato force goals were to be 
developed and work would continue on 
revamping the whole of the European command 
structure. The initial recommendations of the 
command structure study were made in late 
November 1996. 
With the alliance anticipating diffuse security 
risks rather than a clear military threat, political 
and military reasoning suggests that mobility, 
flexibility and rapid response will be vital. Yet 
Nato cannot dedicate itself to preparing 
exclusively for non-Article 5 crises. 
However unlikely at present, the possibility of 
massive instability in Europe in the future, and 
even of an attack on the territory of the allies, 
means Nato must remain able to conduct 
meaningful collective self-defence. 
During the cold war Nato strategy was built 
around vast, standing, peacetime military 
forces. This would now be considered an 
unnecessary luxury in many countries, and so a 
new military framework is needed. 
The challenge is to reconstruct the alliance in 
such a way that it can meet all its commitments 
and responsibilities - from collective self-
defence to crisis management - within the 
constraints of what is now politically acceptable, 
financially and demographically possible and 
strategically fashionable. 
The solution is a military structure which will be 
able to deploy conventional, multinational 
(combined} flexible, inter-service Ooint) force 
combinations (task forces) across the full range 
of contingencies. In other words, the original 
1993 CJTF concept has been developed and 
broadened one step further. 
Writing in Nato Review in March 1996, the 
Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) 
insisted that Nato restructuring be 
comprehensive and include all types of Article 5 
and non-Article 5 missions. Confirming that the 
alliance is not to be split between Article 5 and 
non-Article 5 command arrangements, the 
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Berlin communique refers to a "renovated single 
multinational command structure". 
I WHAT CJTF MEANS 
CJTF is a means, rather than an end in itself. It 
is simply shorthand for a reorganised and 
reinvigorated military structure which will be 
capable of operating effectively across the 
anticipated spectrum of defence and security 
related tasks. Rather than say the restructured 
Nato will be able to produce CJTF, it may be 
more accurate to say CJTF is the basic pattern 
for Nato's military restructuring. 
CJTF is a complex scheme, and there is much 
more work to be done. But it is nothing new or 
spectacular in operational terms. Nor is it simply 
a politico-military leasing arrangement by which 
European allies will be able to make off with 
Nato equipment when needed. 
Yet the flavour of both the foreign and defence 
ministers communique is that CJTF will provide 
ESDI with its teeth. Does this mean ESDI will 
only have soft, baby teeth? Or will ESDI be 
toothless and poverty-stricken, only able to 
chew on something hard when Nato decides to 
lend a set of dentures? 
The June 1996 communique both refer 
frequently to ESDI and appear to take the idea 
seriously. 
But perhaps these references, like those to 
CJTF, are not what they seem. 
France, for instance, had wanted the Berlin 
communique to describe ESDI as a "permanent 
and visible" part of Nato. This form of words was 
too much for other delegations to accept. 
The visibility of ESDI within Nato continues to be 
discussed, with particular focus on giving CJTF 
- a double-hatted, but discrete, European 
command and staff element. 
This, too, raises more questions than it answer. 
Does this suggest that visibility is all that is now 
left of the Continentalist approach to European 
security? Does Nato really take ESDI seriously? 
More to the point, does it have to? Or have the 
Europeanists reduced their expectations to 
mere concerns about their public image? What 
effect will the adaptation of Nato have on the 
position of the EU and the WEU in the overall 
European security framework? 
On the EU side the IGC will look at several 
proposals for improving and strengthening 
CFSP The Maastricht Treaty put movement 
towards an eventual common defence policy 
and common defence on the CFSP agenda. 
Under this item there might be proposals for 
including the WEU's Petersberg humanitarian 
and rescue tasks as treaty commitments, and 
even for a merger of the EU and WEU -
although neither suggestion stands much 
chance of being voted through at the IGC. 
The more important question is whether, given 
all the reforms being made at Nato, the steam 
has gone out of the argument for an EU-based 
common defence policy of any description. 
What are the prospects for the EU in the great 
European security debate? 
I EU AS A DEFENCE STRUCTURE 
While it would be premature to airbrush the EU 
out of the picture, at present the EU's prospects 
as a defence and security structure are clearly 
determined by what the WEU can extract from 
its deal with Nato. This may be too little for those 
who are keen to make the EU into a fully-fledged 
defence and security body. 
Speaking after the Berlin ministerial meeting, 
Britain's Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind was 
of the view the WEU's role "did not include 
combat missions". 
One WEU official thought it inconceivable that 
political control of even peripheral operations of 
this sort could be placed wholly in the hands of 
the EU. It seems most unlikely - at least on the 
level of public policy, where votes are won and 
lost - that the champions of European 
integration could accept a non-combatant 
defence identity which was about as militarily 
significant as an air ambulance and over which 
they had no real political control beyond the 
ability to request the WEU to carry out a specific 
action. 
Some argue that in time the political control of a 
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European CJTF should be placed 
in the hands of the EU Council of 
Foreign Ministers rather than the 
WEU and that an EU request 
should not have to go through a 
US-friendly, second ministerial filter 
at the WEU. 
One senior European Commission 
official, uncertain whether the WEU 
is part of the solution or part of the 
problem, describes political control 
by the WEU as "wasteful duplication". 
Another official insists that, over time, 
governments should approve the necessary 
resources to strengthen DGIA (the Commission 
directorate-general responsible for CFSP), 
rather than commit resources to the Council of 
Foreign Ministers' own, separate policy planning 
staff. In the still more distant future, and with the 
various enlargement processes complete, all 
these turf battles could be resolved by a full 
congruence in the membership of Nato, the 
WEU and the EU. 
From the central European and Baltic states 
viewpoint, the initial problem, however, will be 
how to gain entrance into any or all of these 
organisations, rather than whether or when they 
will merge. 
I CONTINENATLIST HAPPINESS 
The central issue in the near term is how well 
Continentalist aspirations and potential will be 
satisfied by the Nato/ESDI/WEU arrangement. 
The WEU was reinvigorated in 1984 and joined 
the post-cold war security debate in June 1992 
with the publication of its Petersberg Tasks. Yet 
throughout its existence WEU has been in the 
shadow of Nato. In the 1990s its main 
contribution has been as an agent for 
compromise between the bigger players in 
European security. So does the WEU now have 
a convincing discrete political-military role? Or is 
the WEU about to become a victim of the Euro-
Atlantic compromise which it has been so 
instrumental in bringing about? 
The WEU has certainly been busy. It has 
conducted several military operations and is 
preparing for more. Regular meetings are held 
between WEU military chiefs and an operational 
planning cell has been established in Brussels at 
WEU headquarters. 
WEU military planners are preparing 
contingency plans, drawing up lists of WEU-
earmarked forces and have held their first 
command exercises (a 12-month/three phased 
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exercise which began in December 1995, 
known as Crisex, and ended in December 1996. 
Political and military relations between WEU and 
Nato have also improved, with a long-awaited 
mechanism for classified document exchange 
being agreed in May 1996. The WEU Secretary 
General Jose Cutileiro argues that strengthening 
the organisation's operational ability is essential 
to WEU's overall development and expects to 
be ready for Petersberg missions by early 1997. 
"This is not negligible and has to be reckoned 
with," Mr Cutileiro told European Dialogue. 
I QUESTIONS 
Although important questions remain about the 
WEU's relations with Nato (once described by a 
Nato official as "extremely intense superficially, 
but very superficial when it comes to these 
issues"), and about the way a WEU-led CJTF 
would be equipped, conduced and concluded, 
the WEU is developing a significant (small-
scale), staff operational capability. The 
organisation also contributes to western 
outreach through its associate partnership 
scheme. (The WEU has its own version of PFP, 
known as the associate partnership scheme. All 
1 0 central European and Baltic candidates for 
EU membership are associate partners of WEU.) 
WEU provides a convenient base for the EU's 
neutral states (Ireland, Austria, Finland and 
Sweden) as they move tentatively towards 
joining the European defence and security order. 
But the main significance of the WEU may lie 
elsewhere. The WEU has enabled a working 
compromise to be struck between 
integrationism and inter-governmentalism, 
Atlanticism and Europeanism. 
lntegrationism is something like European unity 
- bringing everything about Europe under one 
roof, including the off-limits areas of security 
and defence, which are still the preserve of 
governments. When EU member states deal 
with these issues, they do so on an inter-
governmental basis. 
This approach does not allow much room for the 
European Commission or the fledgling CFSP 
pillar of the EU. As long as member states see 
security and defence as intimately sovereign 
matters, best dealt with at a national level, the 
EU will continue to struggle to form its own 
credible policy in this area. 
At the same time there is also a long-running 
debate within Europe over where western 
defence co-operation should lie. Should it be in 
Europe, as a European effort, or on the Isle of 
Rockall , as an Atlantic effort? How much should 
the US be involved in or lead Europe's defence? 
While Britain, Portugal and Germany have been 
supporters of the Atlanticists, France was 
traditionally a Continentalist - that is until the 
election of Jacques Chirac as France's 
president in 1995. Such a change in policy could 
have - and already has had - a profound 
impact on the way Europe views its defence 
interests. 
The present compromise will hold only for as 
long as the WEU is an integral and visible part of 
it. The dissolution or demotion of the WEU could 
wreck the compromise and bring disagreements 
back into public view, both in Europe and in the 
US. 
Without the political and financial support of 
west European governments, it is hard to 
envisage the WEU - and ultimately the EU -
becoming a coherent, self-contained and 
militarily effective alliance. 
It is equally hard to see such commitments 
being made while European defence budgets 
are partly constrained by economic and 
monetary union (EMU) convergence criteria 
especially by France and Germany - and while 
the Nato/ESDI/WEU formula has the potential to 
give the European allies something like a military 
capability they can call their own, as well as a 
sufficiently visible security and defence identity. 
The Nato/ESDI/WEU formula could prove to be 
a compromise which is both workable and 
necessary. But everything might change. 
Washington might develop a plan to leave 
Europe standing on its own feet by the year 
2000. The IGC might produce a revised CFSP -
dynamic, ambitious and accepted across the 
EU as a sound basis for a Common Defence 
Policy (CDP) and Common Defence (CD). At 
least one highly placed Commission official 
believes the development of a hard EU defence 
identity is "extremely unlikely in the near future". 
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In either circumstance, and 
providing the awkward matter of 
declining defence budgets could 
be addressed, then the WEU might 
- and might have to - be 
transformed into a genuine 
defence and security component 
of the EU. For the foreseeable 
future, however, the compromise 
agreed at the June 1996 Berlin 
ministerial is likely to prevail. 
I UNCLEAR FUTURE 
Europe's defence and security requirements are 
still far from clear. Not only is the nature of any 
military threat to Europe and its interests difficult 
to predict, but the shape and size of Europe are 
changing fundamentally, as are Europe's 
relations with the US - in defence and in other 
areas. 
It appears Nato holds more security and 
defence cards in its hand than its competitors. 
This is the result of several years of reform to the 
military structure of the alliance. The result is a 
Nato that will be able - politically and militarily 
- to carry out the full range of post-cold war 
tasks including Article 5 collective defence and 
non-Article 5 crisis management and other 
missions on behalf of the UN or OSCE or in 
conjunction with the EU and others. 
Reform and adaptation may fail to capture the 
true extent and impact of the changes to Nato's 
military structure. It is the political consequence 
of this military restructuring which is Nato's real 
trump card. 
These reforms have allowed the alliance to 
reposition itself firmly within the bounds of the 
post-cold war European security debate, rather 
than be kept awkwardly at a safe distance. Both 
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politically, through giving ESDI sufficient visibility 
and militarily (through CJTF), Nato has played a 
perfect hand. The opposition has all but 
collapsed. 
In November 1995 EU Commission President 
Jacques Santer described the WEU as central 
to a "dialectic whose nature has changed 
radically in the last three years". A dialectical 
process, of course, is not meant to go on forever 
without producing something useful. 
The European security dialectic seems to have 
come closer than ever before to the realisation 
that the spectres of inefficiency and duplication 
are to be found not so much in Europeans and 
Americans building more tanks than are jointly 
needed, than in sustaining more institutions than 
are required and in devising ever more complex 
arrangements to enable these institutions to co-
operate. 
With uneven political and financial commitment 
to European progress in this field, the 
Nato/ESDI/WEU formula at least makes it 
possible to suspend disbelief as regards the 
prospects for an effective, coherent and self-
contained European security and defence 
identity, and to avoid the awkward truth that in 
the competition to design a new architecture of 
European security the winning blueprint has 
Nato stamped all over it. 
On the other hand confusion in the new security 
and defence architecture could be a sign of 
vitality while the blueprint is now certainly less 
confusing. 
Nato's clarification presents all these three 
institutions (EU, WEU and Nato) with a new set 
of problems. While areas of misunderstanding 
have been removed from the overall 
enlargement debate for these institutions, by 
making clear which bit of the western security 
community the states waiting in the wings could 
be joining, the old problem of membership by 
default rears its head. Will membership in the EU 
by default confer Nato membership and vice-
versa for the candidate countries? 
WHERE.IT LEAVES THE CANDIDATE 
COUNTRIES 
Nato's enlargement plans have clarified the 
picture for EU candidate countries without 
helping them in their bid for EU membership. By 
removing the confusion, and marking the 
boundaries between Nato and the EU on 
defence, the last remaining excuses for not 
accepting new Nato members has been 
removed. 
Such clarity may push along the enlargement 
process but if Nato does enlarge to include 
central Europe and the Baltic states, a new 
danger may be lurking in Europe. Russia has 
already expressed its unease over any Nato 
enlargement that includes these candidate 
states. Its displeasure could present an enlarged 
alliance with a more antagonistic Russia with 
procrastination suiting all the players except the 
candidate countries. * 
Paul Comish, Cambridge 
LIST OF TERMS 
Both the European Union and Nato use a 
variety of acronyms. These can be confusing. 
The following is a brief list of the main 
abbreviations used in this report. 
CD: common defence 
CDP: common defence policy 
CFSP: Common Foreign and Security 
Policy 
CJTF: Combined Joint Task Force 
DGP: Senior Defence Group on 
Proliferation 
EMU: Economic and Monetary Union 
EPC: European Political Co-operation 
ESDI: European Security and Defence 
Identity 
EU: European Union 
FAWEU: Forces Answerable to WEU 
IFOR: Implementation Force 
JGC: Inter-Governmental Conference 
IPP: 
NAC: 
Individual Partnership Programme 
North Atlantic Council 
NACC: North Atlantic Co-operation 
Council 
Nato: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
PARP: Planning and Review Process 
PCG: Policy Co-ordination Group 
PFP: Partnership for Peace 
SACEUR: Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe 
SGP: Senior Politico-Military Group on 
Proliferation 
UN: United Nations 
UNPROFOR: UN protection force 
WEU: Western European Union 
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Security organisations NORTH ATLANTIC CO-OPERATION COUNCIL 
(NACC) 
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY 
ORGANISATION (NATO) 
The North Atlantic Treaty establishing Nato was signed in Washington 
in April 1949 by 12 foreign ministers (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Britain and the US). 
Greece and Turkey acceded to the treaty in 1952, Germany (west) in 
1955 and Spain in 1982. 
The treaty created an alliance for collective defence as defined in article 
51 of the United Nations Charter and led to the formation ofNato. The 
organisation now links 16 independent nations in a voluntary security 
system in which roles, risks and responsibilities are shared. 
Key changes and innovations undertaken by Nato since 1989 include 
the adoption of a new strategic concept. This increased co-ordination 
and co-operation with other international organisations such as the UN, 
OSCE, WEU and the EU. 
Nato contributes to international peacekeeping operations (notably in 
support of UN initiatives designed to restore peace in former 
Yugoslavia). 
The new concept also established the North Atlantic Co-operation 
Council in December 1991 and expanded and intensified political and 
military co-operation in Europe through the Partnership for Peace 
programme, launched in January 1994. The concept combines a broad 
approach to security based on dialogue and co-operation with the 
maintenance of Nato's collective defence capability. It brings together 
political and military elements of Nato's security policy and establishes 
co-operation with new partners in central Europe and the Baltic states 
as well as in the former Soviet republics. 
It provides for reduced dependence on nuclear weapons and introduces 
major changes in Nato's integrated military forces, including substantial 
reductions in their size and readiness; improvements in mobility, 
flexibility and adaptability to different contingencies; increased use of 
multinational formations; creation of a multinational rapid reaction 
corps; and adaptation of defence planning arrangements and 
procedures. A report on the possibility of expanding Nato to include 
more members was published in 1996. 
I PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE (PFP) 
This is a major initiative by Nato directed at increasing confidence and 
co-operation and reinforcing security. States participating in NACC as 
well as OSCE countries are able to contribute to this programme. They 
have been invited to join the Nato member states in this partnership. 
Partner states are invited by NACC to participate in political and military 
bodies at Nato headquarters concerning partnership activities. The 
partnership is aimed at expanding and intensifying political and military 
co-operation throughout Europe, increasing stability, diminishing threats 
to peace and building strengthened relationships by promoting practical 
co-operation and commitment to democratic principles. 
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NACC is a forum for dialogue and 
consultation op political and security-
related issues and for partnership in 
practical co-operation activities in areas 
ofNato competence. The council was created as a result of an initiative 
by the heads of state and government of Nato members in November 
1991. 
The 40-member council includes all 16 Nato member states, plus all 
former members of the Warsaw Pact. Austria, Finland, Sweden and 
Switzerland are observers. 
I WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION (WEU) 
WEU aims, under the Hague platform on European security interests 
agreed in October 1987 are to "develop a more cohesive European 
defence identity which will translate more effectively into practice the 
obligations of solidarity" to which members are committed in the 
framework of WEU and Nato. 
In 1997 the WEU council will present a report to the European Council, 
including a report on progress of the group so far. The secretariat of the 
WEU has been transferred to Brussels and its secretary general attends 
meetings at ministerial level of the North Atlantic Council. 
The Nato secretary general is invited to all WEU ministerial meetings. 
Practical measures of co-operation include joint meetings of the 
councils of Nato and WEU, meetings of the secretaries general and 
regular contacts at working level. The country which holds the WEU 
presidency keeps members of the North Atlantic Alliance informed of 
developments. 
I EUROCORPS 
In January 1988 the governments of Germany (west) and France set up 
a joint security council and formed a joint Franco-German army brigade 
consisting of around 4,000 troops. This brigade became operational in 
October 1990. The basis for a Eurocorps was increased military co-
operation. 
The mission of the European Corps includes: common defence of allies, 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement; and the provision of 
humanitarian aid. Other European countries have been invited to 
participate. An agreement forming Eurocorps was concluded in May 
1992 and provisional headquarters are in Strasbourg. 
In December 1992 an agreement was concluded between the French 
and German authorities and Nato's Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
(Saceur) on the relationship between Eurocorps and Nato and the 
deployment of the corps for operations under Nato command. In May 
1993 Eurocorps' role as a multinational force under the auspices of 
WEU was confirmed by governments and in November 1993 
agreement was reached on the manner of its future employment. 
Belgium announced participation in the corps in June 1993 and in May 
1994 Luxembourg also said it would take part. The Netherlands and 
Spain have also expressed interest in participating. 
Eurocorps became operational in 1996 and consists at present of a 
Franco-German brigade and a number of smaller permanent elements. 
German, French and Belgian formations of division size have been 
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identified for possible assignment to the 
Eurocorps in future. 
ORGANISATION ON 
SECURITY AND CO-
OPERATION IN EUROPE 
(OSCE; formerly known as CSCE, the 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in 
Europe.) 
OSCE is a political consultative process involving 
55 participating states from Europe, Central Asia and 
North America. Launched in 1972 the former CSCE led to 
the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. This 
document encompassed a wide range of commitments on 
principles governing relations between participating 
states, on measures designed to build confidence between 
them, on respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms and on co-operation in economic, cultural, 
technical and scientific fields. 
OSCE = ORGANISATION ON SECURITY 
AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE 
NACC= 
NORTH ATLANTIC CO-OPERATION COUNCIL 
NATO= 
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION 
PFP= 
NATO PARTNERSHIP FOR .PEACE 
UNION 
(1) WEU observers 
(2) WEU associate members (non-EU members of Nato) 
(3) WEU associate partners 
(4) Observers ofNACC 
* Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
** Suspended from OSCE 
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Security framework in Europe 
OSCE NACC NATO PF:P 
ALBANIA • • 
ANDORRA 
ARMENIA • • 
AUSTRIA (1, 4) 
AzERBAIJAN • 
• 
BELGIUM • • 
BosN1A-HERZEGOVINA 
BULGARIA (3) • 
CANADA • • 
CROATIA 
CYPRUS 
CZECH REPUBLIC (3) • 
DENMARK (1) • • 
ESTONIA (3) • 
FINLAND (1, 4) 
FRANCE • • 
fYROM* • 
GEORGIA • 
GERMANY • • 
GREECE • • 
HOLY SEE 
HUNGARY (3) • 
ICELAND (2) • • 
IRELAND (1) 
ITALY • • 
l<AzAKHSTAN • 
KYRGVZSTAN • 
LATVIA (3) • 
LIECHTENSTEIN 
LITHUANIA (3) • 
LUXEMBOURG • • 
MALTA 
MOLDOVA • 
MONACO 
NETHERLANDS • • 
NORWAY (2) • • 
POLAND (3) • 
PORTUGAL • • 
ROMANIA (3) • 
RUSSIA • 
SAN MARINO 
SLOVAKIA (3) • 
SLOVENIA (3) • 
SPAIN • • 
SWEDEN (1, 4) 
SWITZERLAND (4) 
TAJIKISTAN • 
TURKEY (2) • • 
TURKMENISTAN • 
UNITED KINGDOM • • 
UNITED STATES • • 
UKRAINE • 
UZBEKISTAN • • 
YUGOSLAVIA** 
TOTALS: 55 40 16 27 
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Article J 
Maastricht Treaty Title V : 
Provisions on a Common Foreign 
and Security Policy 
require at least 62 votes in favour, cast by at 
least ten members. 
3. If there is a change in circumstances 
having a substantial effect on a question 
subject to joint action, the Council shall 
review the principles and objectives of that 
action and take the necessary decisions. 
A common foreign and security policy is hereby established which shall be governed 
As long as the Council has not acted, the 
joint action shall stand. 
by the following provisions. 
ARTICLE J.1 
1. The Union and its member states shall define 
and implement a common foreign and security 
policy, governed by the provisions of this Title 
and covering all areas of foreign and security 
policy. 
2. The objectives of the common foreign and 
security policy shall be to: 
* safeguard the common values, fundamental 
interests and independence of the Union 
* strengthen the security of the Union and its 
member states in all ways 
* preserve peace and strengthen international 
security, in accordance with the principles of the 
United Nations Charter as well as the principles 
of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the 
Paris Charter 
* promote international co-operation 
* develop and consolidate democracy and the 
rule of law, and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. 
3. The Union shall pursue these objectives by: 
* establishing systematic co-operation between 
member states in the conduct of policy, in 
accordance with Article J.2 
* gradually implementing, in accordance with 
Article J.3, joint action in the areas in which the 
member states have important interests in 
common. 
4. The member states shall support the union's 
external and security policy actively and 
unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual 
solidarity. They shall refrain from any action 
which is contrary to the interests of the Union or 
likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive 
force in international relations. The Council shall 
ensure that these principles are complied with. 
I ARTICLE J.2 
1 . Member states shall inform and consult one 
another within the Council on any matter of 
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foreign and security policy of general interest in 
order to ensure that their combined influence is 
exerted as effectively as possible by means of 
concerted and convergent action. 
2. Whenever it deems it necessary, the Council 
shall define a common position. 
Member states shall ensure that their national 
policies conform to the common positions. 
3. Member states shall co-ordinate their action in 
international organisations and at international 
conferences. They shall uphold the common 
positions in such fora. 
In international organisations and at international 
conferences where not all the member states 
participate, those which do take part shall 
uphold the common positions. 
I ARTICLE J.3 
The procedure for adopting joint action in 
matters covered by foreign and security policy 
shall be the following: 
1. The Council shall decide, on the basis of 
general guidelines from the European Council, 
that a matter should be the subject of joint 
action. 
Whenever the Council decides on the principle of 
joint action, it shall lay down the specific scope, 
the Union's general and specific objectives in 
carrying out such action, if necessary its 
duration, and the means, procedures and 
conditions for its implementation. 
2. The Council shall, when adopting the joint 
action and at any stage during its development, 
define those matters on which decisions are to 
be taken by a qualified majority. 
Where the Council is required to act by a 
qualified majority pursuant to the preceding 
subparagraph, the votes of its members shall be 
weighted in accordance with Article 148(2) of the 
Treaty establishing the European Community, 
and for their adoption, acts of the Council shall 
4. Joint actions shall commit the member 
states in the positions they adopt and in the 
conduct of their activity. 
5. Whenever there is any plan to adopt a national 
position or take national action pursuant to a 
joint action, information shall be provided in time 
to allow, if necessary, for prior consultations 
within the Council. The obligation to provide prior 
information shall not apply to measures which 
are merely a national transposition of Council 
decisions. 
6. In cases of imperative need arising from 
changes in the situation and failing a Council 
decision, member states may take the necessary 
measures as a matter of urgency having regard 
to the general objectives of the joint action. The 
member state concerned shall inform the 
Council immediately of any such measures. 
7. Should there be any major difficulties in 
implementing a joint action, a member states 
shall refer them to the Council which shall 
discuss them and seek appropriate solutions. 
Such solution s shall not run counter to the 
objectives of the joint action or impair its 
effectiveness. 
I ARTICLE J.4 
1. The common foreign and security policy shall 
include all questions related to the security of the 
Union, including the eventual framing of a 
common defence policy, which might in time 
lead to a common defence. 
2. The Union requests the Western European 
Union (WEU), which is an integral part of the 
development of the Union to elaborate and 
implement decisions and actions of the Union 
which have defence implications. The Council 
shall, in agreement with the institutions of the 
WEU , adopt the necessary practical 
arrangements. 
3. Issues having defence implications dealt with 
under this article shall not be subject to the 
procedures set out in Article J.3. 
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4. The policy of the Union in 
accordance with this article shall 
not prejudice the specific character 
of the security and defence policy 
of certain member states and shall 
respect the obligations of certain 
member states under the North 
Atlantic Treaty and be compatible 
with the common security and 
defence policy established within 
that framework. 
5. The provisions of this article shall not prevent 
the development of closer co-operation between 
two or more member states on a bilateral level, in 
the framework of the WEU and the Atlantic 
Alliance, provided such co-operation does not 
run counter to or impede that provided for in this 
title. 
6. With a view to furthering the objective of this 
treaty, and having in view the date of 1998 in the 
context of Article XII of the Brussels Treaty, the 
provisions of this article may be revised as 
provided for in Article N(2) on the basis of a 
report to be presented in 1996 by the Council to 
the European Council, which shall include an 
evaluation of the progress made and the 
experience gained until then. 
I ARTICLE J.5 
1. The presidency shall represent the Union in 
matters coming within the common foreign and 
security policy. 
2. The presidency shall be responsible for the 
implementation of common measures; in that 
capacity it shall in principle express the position 
of the Union in international organisations and 
international conferences. 
3. In the tasks referred to in paragraphs one and 
two, the presidency shall be assisted if need be 
by the previous and next member states to hold 
the presidency. The Commission shall be fully 
associated in these tasks. 
4. Without prejudice to Article J.2(3) and Article 
J.3(4), member states represented in 
international organisations or international 
conferences where not all the member states 
participate shall keep the latter informed of any 
matter of common interest. 
Member states which are also members of the 
United Nations Security Council will concert and 
keep the other member states fully informed. 
Member states ,which are permanent members 
of the Security Council will, in the execution of 
their functions, ensure the defence of the 
positions and the interests of the Union, without 
prejudice to their responsibilities under the 
provisions of the United Nations Charter. 
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I ARTICLE J.6 
The diplomatic and consular missions of the 
member s!ates and the Commission delegations 
in third countries and international conferences, 
and their representations to international 
organisations, shall co-operate in ensuring that 
the common positions and common measures 
adopted by the Council are complied with an 
implemented. 
They shall step up co-operation by exchanging 
information, carrying out joint assessments and 
contributing to the implementation of the 
provisions referred to in Article Be of the treaty 
establishing the European Community. 
I ARTICLE J.7 
The presidency shall consult the European 
Parliament on the main aspects and the basic 
choices of the common foreign and security 
policy and shall ensure that the views of the 
European Parliament are duly taken into 
consideration. The European Parliament shall be 
kept regularly informed by the presidency and 
the Commission of the development of the 
Union's foreign and security policy. 
The European Parliament may ask questions of 
the Council or make recommendations to it. It 
shall hold an annual debate on progress in 
implementing the common foreign and security 
policy. 
I ARTICLE J.8 
1. The European Council shall define the 
principles of and general guidelines for the 
common foreign and security policy. 
2. The Council shall take the decisions necessary 
for defining and implementing the common 
foreign and security policy on the basis of the 
general guidelines adopted by the European 
Council. It shall ensure the unity, consistency and 
effectiveness of action by the Union. 
The Council shall act unanimously, except for 
procedural questions and in the case referred to 
in Article J.3(2). 
3. Any member states or the Commission may 
refer to the Council any question relating to the 
common foreign and security policy and may 
submit proposals to the Council. 
4. In cases requiring a rapid decision, the 
presidency, of its own motion, or at the request 
of the Commission or a member state, shall 
convene an extraordinary Council meeting within 
48 hours or, in an emergency, within a shorter 
period. 
5. Without prejudice to Article 151 of the treaty 
establishing the European Community, a political 
committee consisting of the political directors 
shall monitor the international situation in the 
areas covered by common foreign and security 
policy and contribute to the definition of policies 
by delivering opinions to the Council at the 
request of the Council or on its own initiative. It 
shall also monitor the implementation of agreed 
policies, without prejudice to the responsibility of 
the presidency and the Commission. 
I ARTICLE J.9 
The Commission shall be fully associated with 
the work carried out in the common foreign and 
security policy field. 
I ARTICLE J.10 
On the occasion of any review of the security 
provisions under Article J.4, the conference 
which is convened to that effect shall also 
examine whether any other amendments need 
to be made to provisions relating to the common 
foreign and security policy. 
I ARTICLE J.11 
1. The provisions referred to in Articles 137, 138, 
139to142, 146,147, 150to153, 157to163and 
217 of the treaty establishing the European 
Community shall apply to the provisions relating 
to the areas referred to in this title. 
2. Administrative expenditure which the 
provisions relating to the areas referred to in this 
title entail for the institutions shall be charged to 
the budget of the European Communities. 
The Council may also: 
* either decide unanimously that operational 
expenditure to which the implementation of 
those provisions gives rise is to be charged to 
the budget of the European Communities; in that 
event, the budgetary procedure laid down in the 
treaty establishing the European Community 
shall be applicable 
* or determine that such expenditure shall be 
charged to the member states, where 
appropriate in accordance with a scale to be 
~ci~d. * 
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Commission opinion: reinforcing 
political union and preparing for 
enlargement 
negotiating position is weakened in many 
cases. 
The Commission considers that the treaty 
should include provisions explicitly 
designed to enable the Union to speak 
with one voice and thus defend all the 
relevant interests more effectively. 
The following is extracted from the European Commission's submission to the Inter-
Governmental Conference (IGC) giving the Commission's opinion on common foreign 
i?~~ 
ljd .. .. l . ,i and security policy. 
I CHAPTER II: A CLEAR IDENTITY ON 
THE WORLD SCENE 
The treaty on European Union calls on the 
Union to "assert its identity on the international 
scene". In practice, however, the additional 
influence that the member states were to have 
achieved by acting together has eluded them. 
Their efforts have often been poorly focused 
and are liable to be even more so after 
enlargement. 
The conference should have a clear and simple 
aim: to empower the Union to act rather than 
react, the better to defend the interests of its 
people. 
In some areas, such as trade policy, economic 
assistance, development aid and humanitarian 
action, there is already a coherent single policy 
towards the outside world, though to varying 
degrees. Other areas, such as the common 
foreign and security policy, are still at an early 
stage in their development. 
The prime objectives of the conference should 
therefore be to: 
* bring together the various strands comprising 
foreign relations into a single effective whole, 
with structures and procedures designed to 
enhance consistency and continuity 
* improve the common foreign and security 
policy at all stages of its operation 
* establish a proper European identify with 
regard to security and defence, as an integral 
part of the common foreign and security policy. 
I GREATER CONSISTENCY IN 
FOREIGN POLICY 
The Union must be able to present a united 
front. Its foreign policy as a whole will not be 
effective until there is proper co-ordination 
between its various components, for which 
responsibility is shared among different 
institutions. 
The treaty already requires the Council and the 
Commission to pursue a consistent foreign 
policy. But this has not happened under the 
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treaty as it stands and the institutions' duties in 
this respect should be reinforced. 
The Council presidency and the Commission 
should ensure effective co-operation between 
the two institutions which are responsible for 
various aspects of foreign policy. This would 
considerably enhance the continuity and 
efficacy of the Union's foreign policy. 
I MORE EFFECTIVE COMMUNITY 
ACTION 
There are three areas which need to be 
examined. 
Trade policy 
The treaty should be updated to take account 
of the radical changes in the structure of the 
world economy, in which services, intellectual 
property and direct foreign investment play an 
increasingly important role. These 
development are reflected in the increased 
responsibilities given to the World Trade 
Organisation. 
The Community's powers in these areas are 
poorly defined, leading to needles procedural 
wrangles. This detracts from the Community's 
ability to defend the interests of the member 
states and their businesses. 
The Commission believes that the common 
commercial policy should be clarified 
accordingly. 
The Union's role in international 
organisations 
Under the present treaty the Union is ill-
equipped to conduct negotiations in 
international organisations and take part in 
their activities, as it is increasingly called upon 
to do. Difficulties arise when responsibility for 
the various aspects is split between the 
Community and the individual member states. 
Attempts to co-ordinate the member states' 
positions are made more complicated and, as 
a result, less successful; the Union's 
Co-ordination between member 
states' policies and that of the 
Community 
Generally speaking, in fields where 
responsibility is shared, such as development, 
transport and the environment, the member 
states' policies should be better integrated - by 
means of appropriate mechanisms - with that 
of the Community. 
I A FIRMER BASIS FOR THE COMMON 
FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY 
It needs first of all to be emphasised that the 
common foreign and security policy cannot 
develop without real political resolves on the 
part of the member states, together with clearly 
defined objectives. 
The presidency and the Commission should 
together ensure the visibility of the common 
foreign and security policy. In any event this 
requires a series of improvements, from the 
preparation of decisions through to their 
adoption and implementation. During the 
whole process it is vital that the presidency-
Commission tandem operate coherently and 
efficiently. Within this overall context, the 
Commission, for its part, will strengthen its 
international organisation with this in mind. The 
conference should consider ways and means 
of strengthening the presidency, with support 
from the Council secretariat. 
I PREPARATION OF DECISIONS 
The quality of analysis on which decisions are 
based must be improved. It is also important 
that all member states share the same 
analysis. 
To this end a "joint analysis unit" should be set 
up, composed of experts from the member 
states and the Commission. It would be a joint 
service, possibly with a contribution from the 
Western European Union. Its analyses would 
be useful for the presidency and the 
Commission when drawing up and making 
more consistent their proposals. The location 
of this unit is less important. 
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The formulation of foreign policy 
would be facilitated by the 
incorporation of a permanent 
political committee into the 
Council's existing machinery for 
preparing decisions in Brussels. 
I ADOPTION OF DECISIONS 
The treaty introduced the 
concepts of "common position" 
and "joint action" in connection with the 
common foreign and security policy. In 
practice the distinction between these two 
instruments has become blurred and a source 
of contention. 
The Commission considers that clarification of 
their respective functions is necessary. 
The need for unanimity makes decision-
making difficult, regardless of which instrument 
is used. 
The Commission takes the view that qualified 
majority voting should be the norm for the 
common foreign and security policy. Specific 
rules would apply for decisions involving 
military matters. 
There are also times when some, but not all, of 
the member states wish to take action on a 
specific matter. It should be possible for such 
initiatives to have the status of Union 
measures, as long as they are not against the 
general interests of the Union and provided 
that the latter is duly represented. 
I IMPLEMENTATION OF DECISIONS 
Representing the Union aboard and 
implementing its decisions involves many 
diverse tasks, because of the role of member 
states and the various elements of foreign 
policy. The only constant is the single 
institutional framework: whatever the field, 
whether it be a matter for the Community or for 
inter-governmental co-operation, the decisions 
are taken by the Council. 
Primary responsibility for implementation 
should lie with the presidency and the 
Commission. But this clearly should not 
prevent certain tasks being allocated to 
specific personalities designated on an ad hoe 
basis. 
The current procedure for common foreign and 
security policy decisions involving expenditure 
is both opaque and inefficient; separate 
negotiations have to be held for each decision. 
The Commission proposes that expenditure 
incurred in implementing the common foreign 
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and security policy be included in the 
Community budget, unless an express 
decision to the contrary is taken. 
I A EUROPEAN IDENTITY FOR 
SECURITY AND DEFENCE 
The Union's foreign policy suffers from its 
inability to project credible military force. 
Events in recent years have made th is 
abundantly clear. A genuine European identity 
in the security and defence field is 
indispensable. It requires clear political will on 
the part of member states. 
Nato remains at the centre of Europe's defence 
arrangements and a European pillar should be 
developed within it. In this context, the WEU 
plays a key role as already set out in the Treaty. 
As matters stand, member states do not, 
however, have the same defence commitments 
in relation to Nato and the WEU. 
The Commission believes that a proper 
common foreign and security policy has to 
extend to common defence. 
Accordingly the conference should: 
* allow Union commitments to missions aimed 
at restoring or keeping peace to be written into 
the treaty ("Petersberg missions") 
* reinforce the Union's security capability by 
providing for defence ministers to play an 
appropriate role in the Council 
* review the role of the WEU with a view to 
incorporating it into the Union according to a 
settled timetable. 
In this context the Commission would recall 
that the security and defence of the Union are 
dependent on the existence of a solid industrial 
base performing credibly. This requires better 
integration of the armaments industry into the 
general treaty rules, greater solidarity and co-
operation including the establishment of an 
armaments agency, and a consistent approach 
to foreign trade. * 
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Decision number: 941790/CFSP 
Official Journal reference: L33 (13.12.94) 
• Supplementing decision concerning the joint 
action decided on by the Council on the basis 
of Article J.3 of the treaty on European Union 
on support for the convoying of humanitarian 
aid in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Date: 27. 7.94 
Decision number: 94/510/CFSP 
Official Journal reference: L25 (8.8.94) 
___ __._)~ List of joint actions adopted by 
the Council since the entry into force 
of the Treaty on European Union 
(November 1993-September 1996) 
• Council decision adapting and extending the 
application of decision 93.603/CFSP concerning the joint action decided on by 
the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of convoying of humanitarian aid in 
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 
• Council decision of August 91996 fixing a date on which the effect 
of the common action 96/442/CFSP adopted by the Council on July 
15 1996 comes into affect. 
Date: 9.8.96 
Decision number: 96/508/CFSP 
Official Journal reference: L212 (21.8.96) 
• Common action adopted by the Council on July 26 1996 relating to the 
intermediary arrangements concerning the progressive ending of the 
administration by the EU of Mostar. 
Date: 2617/96 
Decision number: 9611/6/CFSP 
Official Journal reference: Ll95(6.8.96) 
• Common action adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the 
European Union Treaty relating to the nomination of a special EU envoy for the 
city of Mostar. 
Date: 15.7.96 
Decision number: 96/442/CFSP 
Officialfournal reference: L186 (24.7.96) 
• Common action adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty 
on European Union relating to the nomination of the EU special envoy to 
Mostar. 
Date: 15. 7.96 
Decision number: 96/CFSP 
• Common action adopted and based on Article J.3 of the Treaty on European 
Union concerning the action of the EU in the process of elections in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. 
Date: 10.6.96 
Decision number: 96/406/CFSP 
Official Journal reference: Ll68 (6.7.96) 
• Council decision supplementing decision 95/517/CFSP concerning the joint 
action, adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on 
European Union, on continued support for European Union administration of 
the town of Mostar. 
Date: 19.12.95 
Decision number: 951552/CFSP 
Officialfournal reference: L313 (27.12.95) 
• Council decision concerning the joint action, adopted by the Council on the 
basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union, with regard to the 
participation of the European Union in the implementing structures of the peace 
plan for Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Date: 11.12.95 
Decision number: 95/545/CFSP 
Official Journal reference: L309 (21.12.95) 
• Council decision concerning the joint action, adopted by the Council on the 
basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on continued support for 
European Union administration of the town of Mostar. 
Date: 4.12.95 
Decision number: 95/517/CFSP 
Official Journal reference: L298 (11.12.95) 
• Council decision adapting and extending the application of decision 
93/603/CFSP concerning the joint action decided on by the Council on the 
support for the convoying of humanitarian aid in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Date: 4.12.95 
Decision number: 951516/CFSP 
Official Journal reference: L298 (11.12.95) 
• Co"uncil decision supplementing decision 94/790/CFSP concerning the joint 
action, adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on 
European Union, on continued support for European Union administration of 
the town of Mostar. 
Date: 6.2.95 
Decision number: 95123/CFSP 
Official Journal reference: L33 (13.2.95) 
• Council decision supplementing decision 94/790/CFSP concerning the joint 
action, adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on 
European Union on continued support for European Union administration of 
the town of Mostar. 
Date: 12.12.94 
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Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Date: 16.5.94 
Decision number: 94/308/CFSP 
Official Journal reference: Ll34 (30.5.94) 
• Council decision extending the application of decision 93.603/CFSP concerning 
the joint action decided on by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the treaty 
on European Union on support for the convoying of humanitarian aid in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. 
Date: 7.3.94 
Decision number: 94/158/CFSP 
Official Journal reference: L70 (12.3.94) 
• Council decision supplementing the joint action for the convoying of 
humanitarian aid in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Date: 20.12.93 
Decision number: 931729/CFSP 
Official Journal reference: L339 (31.12.93) 
• Council decision concerning the joint action decided on by the Council on the 
basis of Article J.3 of the treaty on European Union on support for the convoying 
of humanitarian aid in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Date: 8.11.93 
Decision number: 93/603/CFSP 
Officialfournal reference: L286 (20.11.93) 
SOUTH AFRICA 
• Council decision on a joint action adopted by the Council on the basis of 
Article J.3 of the treaty on European Union concerning support for the transition 
towards a democratic and multi-racial South Africa. 
Date: 6.12.93 
Decision number: 931678/CFSP 
Officialfournal reference: L316 (17.12.93) 
GREAT LAKES REGION (AFRICA) 
• Council decision relating to the financial incidences of the prorogation of the 
mandate of the special envoy for the Great Lakes region, named by the common 
action 96/250/CFSP. 
Date: 1.10.96 
Decision number: 96/589/CFSP 
Official Journal reference: L260 (12.10.96) 
• Council decision prorogating the application for the common action 
96/250/CFSP adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the European 
Union Treaty relating to the designation of a special EU envoy for the Great 
Lakes region. 
Date: 16.7.96 
Decision number: 961222/CFSP 
Official Journal reference: L185 (24. 7. 96) 
• Council decision propagating an application for common action 96/250/CFSP 
adopted by the Council on the bases of Article J.3 of the Treaty of European 
Union relating to the appointment of a special envoy for the Great Lakes region 
in Africa. 
Date: 15.7.96 
• Common action adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty 
of European Union relating to the nomination of a special EU envoy for the 
Great Lakes region. 
Date: 25.3.96 
Decision number: 96/25/0/CFSP 
Official Journal reference: L887 (4.4.96) 
STABILITY PACT 
• Council decision on the continuation of the joint action adopted by the Council 
on the basis of Article J.3 of the treaty on European Union on the inaugural 
conference on the stability pact. 
Date: 14.6.94 
Decision number: 94/367/CFSP 
Official Journal reference: L165 (l.7.94) 
• Council decision concerning the joint action by the Council on t~e basis of 
Article J.3 of treaty on European Union on the inaugural conference on the 
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stability pact. 
Date: 20.12.93 
Decision number: 93/728/CFSP 
Official Journal reference: L339 (31.12.93) 
MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS 
European Dialogue 
• Council decision supplementing decision 94.276/CFSP on a joint 
action adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the 
treaty on European Union, in support of the Middle East peace 
process, concerning the observation of elections to the Palestinian 
Council and the co-ordination of the international operation for 
observing the elections. 
Date: 25.9.95 
Decision number: 95/403/CFSP 
Official Journal reference: L238 (6.10.95) 
• Council decision on the joint action adopted by the Council on the basis of 
Article J.3 of the treaty on European Union in support of the Middle East peace 
process. 
Date: 1.6.95 
Decision number: 95.205/CFSP 
Official Journal reference: Ll30 (14.6.95) 
• Council decision on a joint action adopted by the Council on the basis of 
Article J(3) of the treaty on European Union, in support of the Middle East 
peace process. 
Date: 19.4.94 
Decision number: 94/276/CFSP 
Official Journal reference: L119 (7.5.94) 
NON-PROLIFERATION 
• Council decision concerning the joint action adopted by the Council on the 
basis of Article J.3 of the treaty on European Union regarding preparation for 
the 1995 conference on the states parties to the treaty on the non-proliferation 
of nuclear weapons. 
Date: 25. 7.94 
Decision number: 94/509/CFSP 
Official Journal reference: L205 (8.8.94) 
RUSSIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 
• Council decision concerning the joint action decided on by the Council on the 
basis of Article J.3 of the treaty on European Union concerning the dispatch of 
a team of observers for the parliamentary elections in Russia. 
Date: 9.11.93 
Decision number: 93/604/CFSP 
Official Journal reference: L286 (20.11.93) 
ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES 
• Council decision relating to the common action adopted by the Council based 
on Article J.3 of the European Union Treaty relating anti -personnel land mines. 
*Joint actions 
I( 
Date: l .Z0.96 
Decision number: 96/688/CFSP 
Official Journal reference: L260 (12.10.96) 
• Council decision complementing decision 95/170/CFSP relating to the common 
action adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty of 
European Union relating to anti-personnel mines. 
Date:25.3.96 
Decision number: 961251/CFSP 
Official Journal reference: L87 (4.4.96) 
• Council decision concerning the joint action adopted by the Council on the 
basis of Article J.3 of the treaty on European Union on anti-personnel mines. 
Date: 12.5.95 
Decision number: 951170/CFSP 
Official Journal reference: L115 (22.5.95) 
SOUTH KOREA 
• Common action adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty 
of European Union relating to the participation of the EU and the organisation 
for the development of energy in South Korea. 
Date: 5.3.96 
Decision number: 961195/CFSP 
Official Journal reference: L63 (13.3.96) 
DUAL-USE GOODS 
• Council decision modifying decision 94/942/CFSP relating to a common action 
adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty of European 
Union concerning the control and export of dual-use goods. 
Date: 27.6.96 · 
Decision number: 96/423/CFSP 
Officia!Journal reference: L176 (13. 7.96) 
• Council decision modifying decision 94/942/CFSP relating to a common action 
adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty of European 
Union concerning the control and export of dual-use goods plus Amendment. 
Date: 16.2.96 
Decision number: 96/173/CFSP 
Official Journal reference: L52 (1.3.96) 
• Council decision amending decision 94.942/CFSP on the joint action adopted 
by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the treaty on European Union 
concerning the control of exports of dual-use goods. 
Date: 10.4.95 
Decision number: 95.127/CFSP 
Official Journal reference: L90 (21.4.95) 
• Council decision on the joint action adopted by the Council on the basis of 
Article J.3 of the treaty on European Union concerning the control of exports of 
dual-use goods. 
Date: 19.12.94 
Decision number: 94/942/CFSP 
Official Journal reference: L367 (31.12.94) 
* 
List of common positions adopted 
by the Council since the entry into 
force of the treaty on European Union 
(November 1993-September 1996) 
certain restrictions on trade with the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro). 
Date: 19.9.95 
Decision number: 951378/CFSP 
Official Journal reference: L227 (22.9.95) 
• Common position defined by the Council on 
the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on 
European Union with regard to the extension 
of the suspension of certain restrictions on 
trade with the Federal republic of Yugoslavia 
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 
Common position defined by the Council on the basis of Article J.2 
of the Treaty on European Union relating to the export of arms to 
former Yugoslavia. 
Date: 26.2.96 
Decision number: 961184/CFSP 
Official Journal reference: L58 (7.3.96) 
• Common position defined by the Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the 
treaty on European Union with regard to the suspension of the restrictions on 
trade with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and 
with the Bosnian Serbs. 
Date: 4.12. 95 
Decision number: 95/511/CFSP 
Official Journal reference: L297 (9.12.95) 
• Common position defined by the Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the 
Treaty on European Union with regard to the extension of the suspension of 
Supplement 1997/1 
(Serbia and Montenegro). 
Date: 7. 7.95 
Decision number: 951254/CFSP 
Official Journal reference: L160 (11.7.95) 
• Common position defined by the Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the 
Treaty on European Union on the suspension of certain restrictions on trade 
with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). 
Date: 12.6.95 
Decision number: 95/213/CFSP 
Official Journal reference: Ll38 (21.6.95) 
• Common position defined by the Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the 
Treaty on European Union with regard to the extension of the suspension of 
certain restrictions on trade with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro). 
Date: 28.4.95 
Decision number: 95/150/CFSP 
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Official Journal reference: L99 (29.4. 95) 
• Common position defined by the Council on the basis of Article 
J.2 of the Treaty on European Union and concerning the 
prorogation of the suspension of certain trade restrictions with the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). 
Date: 23.1.95 
Decision number: 95111/CFSP 
Officia!Journal reference: L20 (27.1.95) 
• Common position defined by the Council on the basis of Article 
J.2 of the Treaty on European Union and concerning the reduction 
of economic and financial relations with those parts of the territory 
of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina under the control of the 
Bosnian Serb forces. 
Date: 10.10.94 
Decision number: 94/672/CFSP 
Official Journal reference: L266 (15.10.94) 
• Council decision on the common position defined by the Council on the basis 
of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union concerning prohibition of the 
satisfaction of the claims referred to in paragraph 9 of the UN Security Council 
Resolution 757 (1992). 
Date: 13.6.94 
Decision number: 94/366/CFSP 
Official Journal reference: L165 (1.7.94) 
UKRAINE 
• Common position defined by the Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the 
Treaty on European Union on the objectives and priorities of the European 
Union towards Ukraine. 
Date: 28.11.94 
Decision number: 941779/CFSP 
Officia!Journal reference: L313 (6.12.94) 
HAITI 
• Common position defined by the Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the 
Treaty on European Union on European Union regarding the termination of the 
reduction of economic relations with Haiti. 
Date: 14.10.94 
Decision number: 94/681/CFSP 
Official Journal reference: L271 (21.10.94) 
• Council decision concerning the common position defined on the basis of 
Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union on European Union regarding the 
reduction of economic relations with Haiti. 
Date: 30.5.94 
Decision number: 94/315/CFSP 
Officia!Journal reference: LJ39 (2.6.94) 
NIGERIA 
• Council decision on the common position defined on the basis of Article J.2 of 
the Treaty on European Union propagating the common position 95/544/CFSP 
on Nigeria. 
Date: 3.6.96 
Decision number: 96/361/CFSP 
Official Journal reference: L1432 (15.6.96) 
• Council decision on the common position defined on the basis of Article J.2 of 
the Treaty on European Union on Nigeria. 
Date: 4.12.95 
Decision number: 951544/CFSP 
Official Journal reference: L309 (21.12.95) 
• Council decision on the common position defined on the basis of Article J.2 of 
the treaty on European Union on Nigeria. 
Date: 20.11.95 
Decision number: 95/515/CFSP 
Official Journal reference: L298 (11.12.95) 
RWANDA 
• Council decision on the common position adopted by the Council on the basis 
of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union concerning the objectives and 
priorities of the Etropean Union towards Rwanda. · 
Date: 24.10.94 
Decision number: 941697/CFSP 
Official Journal reference: L283 (29.10.94) 
SUDAN 
• Council decision on the common position defined on the basis of Article J.2 of 
the Treaty on European Union concerning the imposition of an embargo on 
arms, munitions and military equipment on Sudan. 
Date: 15.3.94 
Decision number: 94/165/CFSP 
Official Journal reference: L75 (17.3.94) 
* 
* 
* * 
LIBYA 
• Council decision on the common position defined on the basis of Article J.2 of 
the Treaty on European Union with regard to the reduction of economic 
relations with Libya. 
Date: 2.11.93 
Decision number: 93/614/CFSP 
Official Journal reference: L295 (30.11.93) 
BURUNDI 
• Council decision on the implementation of the common P?Sition of March 24 
1995 defined by the Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European 
Union, with regard to Burundi. 
Date: 6.6.95 
Decision number: 951206/CFSP 
Official Journal reference: L130 (14.6.95) 
• Council decision on the common position defined on the basis of Article J.2 of 
the Treaty on European Union, with regard to Burundi. 
Date: 24.3.95 
Decision number: 95/91/CFSP 
Official Journal reference: L72 (1.4.95) 
ANGOLA 
• Council decision on the common position defined on the basis of Article J.2 of 
the Treaty on European Union, with regard to Angola. 
Date: 29.10.95 
Decision number: 95/413/CFSP 
Official Journal reference: L245 (12.10.95) 
CO-LOCATION OF DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS 
• Council decision on the common position defined on the basis of Article J.2 of 
the Treaty on European Union, with regard to the possible co-location of 
diplomatic missions. 
Date: 6.10. 95 
Official Journal reference: not published 
BLINDING LASERS 
• Council decision on the common position defined on the basis of Article J.2 of 
the Treaty on European Union, concerning blinding lasers. 
Date: 18.9.95 
Decision number: 95/379/CFSP 
Official Journal reference: L227 (22.9.95) 
BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS OF MASS 
DESTRUCTION 
• Defining the common position of the Council based on Article J.2 of the Treaty 
on European Union relating to the preparation of the fourth conference and 
revision of the convention on the setting up, building and stockpiling of 
biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction. 
Date: 25.6.96 
Decision number: 96/408/CFSP 
Official Journal reference: L168 (6. 7.96) 
EASTTIMOR 
• Defining the common position of the Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the 
Treaty on European Union relating to East Timar. 
Date: 25.6.96 
Decision number: 96/407/CFSP 
Official Journal reference: L168 (6. 7.96) 
* 
